Coordinating WASH efforts

The water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector in sub-Saharan Africa is made up of a range of organisations and institutions whose various approaches to providing WASH services are all slightly different. Reading this blog, one can see that the WASH services in SSA are provided by government institutions, private companies, philanthropic organisations and NGOs, all operating over multiple scales, in different environments and with different models of provision.

Even at local scales there can often be multiple actors working side by side but using different approaches to provide WASH services. The result is that the sector is extremely fragmented and incoherent and in many cases highly inefficient and unsustainable. A simple example that could be solved easily through better communication is the type of water pipe that is used. Different service providers use different pipes and this can mean that the water and sanitation systems of cities can consist of many different types of pipe, each requiring different kinds of expertise and different replacement parts. These types of challenges are the result of WASH financing being channeled too often into short-term, independent projects that are not part of wider common plan (Battle 2015).

At the root of these challenges is the way WASH actors work with each other. While SDG 6 sets out a clear and united set of goals to be achieved by 2030, the development strategies and the structures through which they are delivered can sometimes lead to inconsistent approaches that undermine the development process. To address this issue, recent efforts have been made by WaterAid and other sector partners to identify 'collaborative behaviours that, if adopted by countries and their partners, will make development cooperation more effective in the sector, and ensure universal, sustainable access to WASH services' (Battle 2015). Four behaviours have been identified:

Applying these behaviours to the water sector is a challenge but progress is already being made. In 2015 these behaviours were adopted by the Sanitation and Water for All (SWA) partnership, a global consortium of WASH development actors including over 150 country governments dedicated to working 'towards a common vision of sanitation, hygiene and water for all, always and everywhere' (SWA 2016). Experience from other sectors suggests that a global platform such as SWA has an important role to play in realising the universal adoption of these behaviours (Sanitation and Water for All 2016).

Institutional change is notoriously difficult to achieve for it poses a threat to the established ways of thinking and must often must be done through those persons who have been most successful in the current system. However, the adoption of these behaviours by the SWA represents an important step towards achieving an effective and coordinated action in water and sanitation development. 

Liberia is one such country whose government has been aiming to increase coordination in the WASH sector with the help of SWA. To do this, a number of institutions have been set up to coordinate and monitor the many actors involved in the WASH sector in Liberia. The National Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion Committee (NWSHPC) was set up in 2012 and by 2013 was coordinating the activities of 51 institutions both government, private and charitable. Without such an umbrella committee, the activities of these institutions that include the likes of WaterAid, Oxfam and the Liberian Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, would be near impossible to coordinate and organise into an effective action.

Harmonisation in the WASH sector is beginning to happen at a global, national and local scale and represents an important step forward for the sector which currently suffers from inefficiencies due to a lack of coordination between actors. However, many challenges lie ahead including a lack of institutional capacity to organise the almost absurd number of WASH actors, a lack of political will to bring about change that may require more funding and a change to the status quo, and disagreements between actors that have conflicting attitudes about WASH provision (WELL 2016). What is certain however is that if the SDG number 6 goal is to be completed by 2030, it will require the coordinated efforts of institutions around the world of all types and sizes and not a confused mess of short-term, parallel delivery mechanisms fated to undermine one another. 

The cost of 'total cost recovery'

South Africa is leading the way in Africa in terms of privatising its water sector and is therefore a useful case study for other sub-Saharan countries considering the private sector as a solution to their issues with water provision.

In 1991, apartheid in South Africa was abolished, putting an end to a system of racial discrimination and segregation that had split the country for almost 50 years. Three years later, on the 27th of April 1994, the country held its first democratic election and voted decisively to give power to the African National Congress (ANC); a party that promised to create a more equal society by restoring the rights of those previously oppressed. To do this, one of the ANC's central policies was to provide every person with access to adequate health facilities, sanitation, and a clean, safe water supply. Not long after, in 1996, these policies were successfully enshrined in the constitution;

South Africa is one of the only countries in the world to make access to clean water a constitutional right and yet today, many of the poorest people in the country remain without continuous access to safe, clean water supplies. Soon after the election of the ANC, local municipalities were urged by the government to increase the cost recovery of water utilities. To do this, some municipalities turned to the private sector; granting long-term contracts to private multi-nationals. One such case was the Mbombela municipality, which awarded a 30-year concession agreement to a subsidiary of the British water company Biwater in 1999. Other municipalities decided to reorganise their utilities as profit-driven, publicly owned enterprises (Pauw 2003).

However, this policy of cost recovery has attracted major criticism. Many argue that while water and sanitation services have been dramatically expanded since 1994, access to these services remains a problem in poor communities because many people cannot afford to pay for them. This issue came to a head in 2003 when hundreds of people in South Africa died and many thousands more were hospitalised during an outbreak of cholera. The cause of the epidemic was blamed on the fact that many people had been cut off from their water supplies because of their inability to pay, and therefore had been forced to use unsafe sources of water (Pauw 2003). Between 1994 and 2002 as many as 10 million South Africans had their water supply cut off for various amounts of time.

Today, water provision remains a big social problem in South Africa. Since 2012 there has been almost one protest per day linked to water provision, deriving mainly from complaints about tariff prices and water quality in urban and peri-urban areas (WRC 2016, Aljazeera 2014).  The process of cost recovery in many municipalities can therefore be said to have undermined the original aims of privatisation. Some have even compared the emerging disparities in provision between rich and poor as a new form of apartheid (New York Times 2003).

Gauging Province, SA, saw 500 delivery protests in just a few months in 2014. Though few made the news.

It therefore seems irresponsible of the World Bank and developed countries such as the UK to be pressurising sub-Saharan African countries into adopting private sector models of utility provision. In 2001 for example, the Department for International Development in the UK gave Ghana a loan of £10 million on condition that it privatised its urban water supply (WSWS 2003). Other countries including Benin, Angola and Guinea Bissau have been given similar propositions by the IMF and the World Bank leading to a widespread shift towards privatisation across sub-Saharan Africa. Further cause for concern stems from the fact that there are only a few private water companies currently operating in sub-Saharan Africa and almost all of these are foreign - most of them either British of French.  

The water issues in South Africa should serve as warning to those considering private sector models of utility provision. Sub-Saharan Africa is home to many millions of people in similar situations to those that cannot afford to pay for running water in South Africa. These people would likely best be served by a government-subsided supply of water and could be devastated if the current wave of privatisation forces them to turn to unsafe sources of water. 

Necessity is the mother of invention

In 2011, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation launched a water and sanitation programme entitled 'The Reinvent the Toilet Challenge" in a bid to find sustainable sanitation solutions to help the billions of people worldwide without access to improved sanitation facilities. The foundation offers grants to researchers around the world trying to come up with innovative toilet designs that meet a number of guidelines set by the foundation.

The guidelines state that the toilet must:

• Remove germs from human waste and recover valuable resources such as energy, clean water, and nutrients.
• Operate "off the grid" without connections to water, sewer, or electrical lines.
• Cost less than US$0.05 cents per user per day.
• Promote sustainable and financially profitable sanitation services and businesses that operate in poor, urban settings.
• Be a truly aspirational next-generation product that everyone will want to use-in developed as well as developing nations.

 

This is an interesting and ingenious approach to water and sanitation development that will hopefully provide new answers to the problems facing sanitation provision in Africa's urban slums. If you would like to know more about this project or the other philanthropic sanitation work the Gates Foundation is carrying out follow this link. 

It works in the UK, so why not privatise the water sector in Africa?

In the United Kingdom our water supply is owned outright and operated by the private sector. In 1989 under the Thatcher government, the ten previously public regional water authorities in England and Wales were sold and since then the government has assumed a regulatory role via two institutions; the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) and the Environmental Agency. Water and sanitation coverage in the UK is 100%, continuity of supply is 100%, waste water treatment is 100% and the water companies are strictly regulated to ensure high standards of service, reinvestment in infrastructure and low environmental impacts. So is our model of water and sanitation service something that should be strived for in sub-Saharan Africa where the public sector has more often than not failed to provide sufficient coverage?

The debate regarding the role of the private sector in utility provision has been going for a long time but it has recently come to the forefront of water and development policy in sub-Saharan Africa. In response to widespread public sector failure, over the last 30 years there has been a shift from the state to the private sector in utility provision which has been driven by idealogical arguments of market forces, increased efficiency, reduced corruption and improved cost recovery. However, while at least 14 countries in SSA have privatised their water sector to some extent since 1960, results have been highly varied and the evidence suggests that in many cases privatisation has not led to any significant improvements in service (Bayliss 2003).

For any government looking to shift the responsibility of utility provision to the private sector, there are a broad range of options available that differ in the extent to which responsibility and risk is transferred. At its lowest level, this involves short term management contracts of 2-5years in which a private company bids for the contract and once won, operates the water supply network for profit until the contract is renewed. In these arrangements the water supply network remains under government ownership and the government is responsible for the maintenance and expansion of the infrastructure. Leases and concessions are similar arrangements but contracts may be awarded for up to 50 years. In these cases, the private company usually has to meet contractual agreements regarding investments in infrastructure but may have more power regarding the pricing structure of the service. The most extreme scenario, as is the case of the UK, is complete divestiture of the water network in which the whole system is sold and ownership is completely transferred to the private sector. This last scenario has not yet occurred in Africa.

So in the 14 countries that have partially resorted to privatisation in SSA, what have been the results? Kate Bayliss (2003) looked at just this and found that results have been mixed. Her three key findings were firstly that the impact of privatisation was highly dependant upon the precursive conditions of the water supply system that the private sector inherited. In countries that already had relatively good systems of water provision such as Senegal and Gabon, performance and coverage was slightly improved following privatisation. In countries such as Guinea on the other hand, where the private sector got involved with weak systems of water supply, improvements did not occur and in some cases prices soared and no investments were made in expanding the network infrastructure. Secondly, regulation of the private companies and their performance has proved extremely difficult even where institutional capacity is relatively advanced. And thirdly, the idealogical arguments for privatisation have been undermined by a lack of investor interest and competition for government contracts.

If we link this back to the UK. At the point of privatisation in 1989, water and sanitation provision in England and Wales was already excellent. Performance was good and bill collection was very high. Since then, performance has been slightly improved in terms of reduced leakage, infrastructure expansion, increased service reliability and increased water quality. Furthermore, a strong existing institutional structure has held private water companies to strict laws and regulations. In 2016, Thames Water was fined £1million after the Environmental Agency found that they had accidentally released sewage into a canal in Hertfordshire. In other cases, fines were ordered to be reinvested in infrastructure rather than given to the government directly, and in 1998 a law was passed to make it illegal for water companies to cut off houses following non-payment.

Poorly performing inlet screens failed to prevent sewage entering the  Grand Union Canal in Hertfordshire

However, while performance has improved, in the first nine years after 1989, water tariffs increased by 46% while operating profitability increased by 142%! This can be partly attributed to the natural 'monopolous' nature of water networks. The success of the private sector is based strongly upon the concept of competition. In the UK competition is partly induced by Ofwat but water companies can still to a large extent assume a permanent customer base due to their individual spatial monopolies and therefore get away with relatively high prices. Fortunately for them, in the UK pretty much everyone can afford to pay such prices.

Using Bayliss' findings we can conclude that privatisation has worked in the UK because the inherited system was already very good, there was a strong institutional capacity for regulation and the customer base was wealthy enough to allow the water companies to make substantial profits while meeting service requirements. Furthermore, Ofwat has enough power to induce incentives for good performance thus simulating a reasonable degree of competition.  In sub-Saharan Africa however, many of these conditions are lacking. Privatisation may not therefore be the best way forward, particularly for those countries where water and sanitation provision are the least developed. Bayliss concludes that privatisation should be considered much more carefully in context with the conditions of the prospective country and that while success is possible, it should not be pushed by international donors as the ultimate solution to all SSA's water supply problems. Others are even more sceptical, arguing that government regulation in much of Africa is simply not conducive with utility privatisation and that it will therefore lead to many of the poorest people being completely cut off from safe water supplies.

Dakar: a unique challenge in need of a unique solution.

This blog has recently focused a lot on participatory development approaches and how these owe part of their success to the recognition that development challenges are context specific and require adapted solutions. In a recent lecture on climate change and water supply, I learned a little about the challenges facing urban communities in Dakar, Senegal and saw that this was a good example of an urban area facing a unique set of problems that requires an equally unique and ingenious set of solutions.

Rapid population growth in Dakar has resulted in an increased demand for water and a growing pressure on an already stressed and inadequate water supply (Re et al. 2010). Public water supply in Dakar is sourced from a combination of groundwater (46%) and surface water piped from the Senegal River via hundreds of kilometres of underground pipes (Taylor 2016). The sanitation infrastructure is dominated by septic tanks that are attached to households and emptied periodically by tanker trucks.

Household Septic Tank in Dakar

Source: Professor Richard Taylor 2016

A combination of challenges stand in the way of effective water supply and sanitation in this city. The main issue is groundwater contamination. In recent decades groundwater has been cited as the answer to water and sanitation provision across much of Africa (Taylor et al. 2009). Not only are groundwater resources in Africa plentiful and relatively simple to access in many regions, they also provide a comparatively high-quality supply of water that tends to require less or even no chemical treatment compared to surface water and also stand to be the only water resource that may benefit from climate change (Taylor et al. 2013). However, in Dakar groundwater may not be the solution. Although the city depends heavily on groundwater for its public water supply, the groundwater quality here is incredibly low. 

The low-quality of the groundwater in Dakar is mostly due to contamination from human waste. Many of the septic tanks in the city are poorly maintained and as a result occasionally spill over allowing effluent to drain to the aquifer. Furthermore, during rainfall events, public toilets and sceptic tanks may flood and spill out onto the streets and also drain to the aquifer. Waste may reach the aquifer via a number of pathways. If it drains through the soil and there is a long enough distance between the surface and the water table, the harmful organisms in the waste may be removed and subsequently the aquifer will not be harmed. However, if the water table is shallow, some harmful organisms may reach the aquifer before effective filtration has taken place. Alternatively, waste may drain to the aquifer more directly via a macropore in the subsurface. This could either be a vertical crack in the ground or man made heterogeneity such as a poorly sealed well. 

Aquifer contamination from human waste means that groundwater may contain harmful pathogens and have much higher levels of nitrates. The international guideline for the concentration of nitrate in drinking water is 50mg/l. This value is based on evidence for the development of methaemoglobinaemia in infants exposed to higher concentrations (WHO 2011). In Dakar, nitrate levels have been found to be as high as 500mg/l. 

However, it is not only fecal contamination that threatens the quality of Dakar's groundwater. Due to its coastal location, the aquifer is at risk from salt water intrusion if too much groundwater pumping occurs. This means that even if the Dakar authorities prevented contamination from human waste, the aquifer may still not be able to provide the city with enough freshwater.

Dakar is in a difficult position and is in need of alternative water and sanitation solutions to those now being widely promoted elsewhere across Africa. Already a number of ingenious solutions are being proposed including waste treatment (shown in the video above) and the pumping of urban groundwater to peri-urban areas where it can be used to both irrigate and fertilise farmland. But it is clear that more needs to be done to improve water and sanitation provision in this city.